Norm-making and the Global South: Attempts to Regulate Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems by Bode, Ingvild
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Bode, Ingvild  (2019) Norm-making and the Global South: Attempts to Regulate Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems".   Global Policy .    ISSN 1758-5880.    (In press)
DOI












The	 international	 community	 has	 been	 debating	 lethal	 autonomous	 weapons	 systems	
(LAWS)	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	UN	Convention	 on	 Certain	 Conventional	Weapons	 (UN-
CCW)	since	2014.	Here,	a	growing	number	of	states	from	the	Global	South	have	been	active	
participants	and	expressly	support	a	preventive	legal	ban	of	fully	autonomous	systems.	This	
is	 an	 interesting	 observation	 for	 two	 reasons:	 first,	 their	 vocal	 activism	 within	 a	 UN	
disarmament	 forum	 is	 noteworthy	 as	 these	 sites	 have	 often	 not	 been	 associated	 with	
significant	 representation	 from	 the	 Global	 South,	 not	 least	 due	 to	 financial	 pressures.	
Second,	 their	 engagement	 speaks	 to	 an	 evolving	 critical	 agenda	 in	 norm	 research,	
recognising	 developing	 states	 as	 norm-makers	 rather	 than	 norm-takers	 and	 thereby	
counteracting	a	long-standing	hierarchical	depiction	of	norm	promotion,	development,	and	
















Global	 South.	 Data	 collected	 by	 Article	 36	 reveals	 that	 ‘the	 lower	 a	 country’s	 income	
category,	the	less	likely	they	will	[…]	attend,	speak	or	hold	formal	roles	at	any	given	meeting’	
across	 international	 disarmament	 fora	 (2016	 p.6).	 This	 underrepresentation	 has	 not	 only	
been	 associated	 with	 a	 decreased	 effectiveness	 of	 disarmament	 negotiations	 (Borrie	 &	
Thornton	2008	pp.53–70),	but	also	has	an	effect	on	how	disarmament	norms	are	framed	to	
the	detriment	of	priorities	associated	with	the	Global	South	(Nash	2015	p.120).		
	 Such	 dynamics	make	 studying	 the	Global	 South’s	 deliberation	 efforts	 on	 LAWS	 an	
interesting	case	to	highlight	their	agency	in	potential	norm-making	at	the	international	level.	
Norm	 localisation	 scholars	 have	 long	 investigated	 the	 agency	 of	Global	 South	 countries	 in	




is	 determined	 by	 the	 so-called	 “great	 powers”	 (Epstein	 2012).	 But	 efforts	 to	 study	Global	
South	norm-making	at	international	sites	have	only	recently	gained	more	attention	in	norm	
research	 (Bode	2014a;	Sikkink	2014;	Helleiner	2014;	Bode	&	Karlsrud	2018;	Acharya	2014;	





bias	 in	 norms	 research.	 Due	 to	 this	 focus,	 I	 frame	 the	 debate	 on	 LAWS	 in	 the	 context	 of	
norms	research	rather	than	reviewing	the	substance	of	arguments	put	forward	in	support	or	
in	 opposition	 of	 a	 ban	 on	 LAWS	 at	 the	 UN-CCW.	 I	 first	 survey	 literature	 in	 critical	 norm	





Scholars	 of	 International	 Relations	 (IR)	 have	 frequently	 captured	 the	 processes	 leading	 to	
the	institutionalisation	of	new	norms,	loosely	understood	as	‘standards	of	appropriateness’	
(Bode	&	Huelss	2018	p.394)	 in	 this	article,	as	shaped	by	global	power	relations	that	divide	




	 While	 early	 constructivist	 norm	 research	 departs	 significantly	 from	 previous	 IR	
theories	 in	 concentrating	 on	 ideational	 components,	 their	 (implicit)	 assumptions	 in	 this	
context	mirror	 to	 an	 extent	 those	 of	 prior	 approaches:	 neo-realism	with	 its	 focus	 on	 the	
distribution	 of	 capabilities	 to	 explain	 international	 rule-making	 and	 neo-liberalism’s	
perspective	 of	 rational	 cost-benefit	 calculating	 actors	 competing	 over	 setting	
particularistically	beneficial	rules.	The	language	of	norm-takers	and	norm-makers	suggests	a	
clear-cut	 division	 of	 roles	 into	 those	 who	 set	 international	 standards	 and	 those	 who	 are	
supposed	 to	 comply	 with	 them.	 This	 portrayal	 of	 norm	 diffusion	 solidifies	 present	




exclusively	 as	 “norm-takers”	 is	 also	 historically	 inaccurate.	 It	 forgets	 or	 actively	 omits	 the	







takers	 in	 two	 ways:	 first,	 scholars	 of	 norm	 localisation	 have	 demonstrated	 how	 regional,	
national,	 and	 local	 implementation	 processes	 of	 international	 norms	 cannot	 be	 simply	
subsumed	under	the	passive	label	of	“norm-taking”,	but	necessarily	leave	room	for	different	
instantiations,	 interpretation,	 accountability,	 and	 practice	 (Acharya	 2009;	 Zimmermann	
2017).	 Such	 studies	 concentrate	 on	 the	 ‘agency	 of	 the	 governed’	 (Draude	 2017	 p.577)	 in	
changing	 normative	 meaning	 when	 diffusing	 content.	 Still,	 localisation	 studies	 remain,	 to	
some	extent,	attached	to	top-down	dynamics	in	focussing	on	processes	at	the	regional	and	
local	 levels.	 The	 flip	 side	 of	 this	 focus	 is	 that	 peripheral	 actors	 of	 the	 Global	 South	 are	
portrayed	 as	 having	 limited	 immediate	 agency	 in	 processes	 of	 norm-making	 at	 the	
international	 level.	Second,	 the	most	recent	wave	of	studies	 in	critical	norm	research	have	
begun	 to	 address	 this	 blind	 spot	 (Wiener	 2017;	 Stalley	 2018),	 for	 example	 through	
introducing	 concepts	 such	 as	 norm	 subsidiarity	 (Acharya	 2011).	 Research	 on	 China’s	
emerging	 (leadership)	 role	 in	 global	 governance	 can	 also	 be	 connected	 to	 this	 endeavour	
(e.g.	 Lee,	 Chan	 &	 Chan	 2012;	 Reilly	 2012),	 given	 that	 China	 continues	 to	 be	 listed	 as	 an	
official	development	assistance	recipient	on	the	OECD-DAC	list.		
	 Still,	 norm	 research	 has	 typically	 cast	 Western	 liberal	 democracies,	 in	 particular	
Scandinavian	states	(Egeland	1988;	Finnemore	1996;	Ingebritsen	2002),	in	the	role	of	norm	
entrepreneurs,	that	 is	 ‘actors	committed	to	a	particular	 idea	set	out	to	change	the	existing	
normative	 context	 and	 alter	 the	 behaviour	 of	 others	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 new	 norm’	
(Björkdahl	 2002	 p.46).	 This	 literature	 associates	 two	 strategies	 with	 how	 small	 or	 middle	
power	states	attempt	to	create	leverage	for	their	norm-making	practices:	using	international	
institutional	 platforms	 and	 forging	 coalitions	 with	 non-governmental	 organisations	
(Nadelmann	 1990;	 Finnemore	 &	 Sikkink	 1998;	 Hampson	 &	 Reid	 2003;	 Behringer	 2005).	
Studies	on	global	disarmament	efforts,	such	as	the	1997	Chemical	Weapons	Convention,	the	
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2001	 Ottawa	 Convention,	 or	 the	 2010	 Cluster	 Munitions	 Convention	 have	 therefore	
demonstrated	how	 small	Western-liberal	 states	used	 institutional	 platforms	and	 coalitions	
with	 (networks	of)	NGOs	 to	promote	new	 international	norms	 (Price	&	Tannenwald	1996;	
Donaghy	2003;	Rosert	2019).	Analytically,	 there	 is	nothing	to	suggest	 that	 (small)	states	of	
the	Global	South	should	not	also	be	able	to	adopt	these	strategies.	







	The	NWPT	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 to	 express	 their	 disillusionment	
and	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	 Treaty	 (NPT)	 (Thakur	 2017	 p.71),	 in	
particular	their	“dominated”	status	as	non-nuclear	states	in	light	of	how	nuclear	states	fail	to	
uphold	their	side	of	the	NPT	compromise	in	failing	to	progressively	get	rid	off	their	nuclear	
arsenals.	 Also,	 practically	 all	 Western-liberal	 states	 that	 have	 typically	 been	 chiefly	
associated	with	 humanitarian	 arms	 control	 initiatives,	 except	 for	 Norway	 and	 Austria,	 did	
not	 participate	 in	 the	 talks	 that	 led	 to	 the	 NWPT	 because	 of	 their	 embedding	 in	 the	 US	
alliance	system	(Potter	2017;	Knopf	2018).	Notably,	a	whopping	98	(80%)	of	the	122	states	
that	voted	in	favour	of	the	NWPT	in	July	2017	were	states	of	the	Global	South	(UN	General	
Assembly	 2017).	 In	 light	of	 this,	 Thakur	 stipulates	 that	 ‘the	 […]	 historic	 significance	of	 the	
NWPT	might	well	 be	 that	 the	 non-Western	 and	 small	 states	 of	 international	 society	 have	
forced	 through	 an	 instrument	 of	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 against	 the	 will	 of	 most	
Western	countries	and	all	major	powers’	(Thakur	2017	p.84).	
	 Discussions	about	LAWS	at	the	UN-GGE	represent	a	similar	type	of	opening	for	the	
norm-making	 efforts	 of	 the	 Global	 South.	 Yet,	 in	 this	 case,	 commentators	 still	 tend	 to	
replicate	the	Western	bias	associated	with	norm-takers/norm-makers	in	two	ways:	first,	by	
evaluating	 the	 ongoing	 cooperation	 between	 Global	 South	 states	 and	 civil	 society	 (that	
literature	 has	 identified	 as	 characteristic	 of	 many	 humanitarian	 disarmament	 efforts)	 in	
hierarchical	 terms,	 e.g.	 based	 on	 an	 information	 deficit	 (Galliott	 2018),
iii
	or	 second,	 by	
remaining	 attached	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 Western-liberal	 democracy,	 for	 example	 Germany,	






I	 examine	 international	 deliberations	 on	 LAWS	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 UN-CCW	 from	
2014-2019	as	attempts	at	norm-making	by	countries	of	the	Global	South.	Entering	into	force	






humanitarians	 and	 viewed	 sceptically	 by	 military	 lawyers	 and	 state	 actors’	 (Carvin	 2017	
p.38).	It	is	interesting	to	consider	the	UN-CCW’s	backstory	in	light	of	the	fact	that	it	currently	
serves	 as	 the	 only	 international	 deliberative	 forum	 where	 LAWS	 are	 substantially	 and	









	material	 with	my	 own	 observations	 gained	 from	 participant	 observation	 of	 the	
November	2017	and	August	2018	GGEs.	
	 The	UN-CCW	has	125	high	contracting	parties,	72	of	which	are	Global	South	states	
parties,	 and	 50	 signatories.	 Some	 vocal	 Non-Aligned	Movement	 (NAM)	 countries	 such	 as	
Egypt	 or	 Indonesia,	 representing	 an	 important	 grouping	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 UN	 voting	
patterns,	 are	 not	 states	 parties	 to	 the	UN-CCW.	 This	means	 that	Global	 South	 and	Global	
North	states	parties	are	likely	to	have	a	more	equal	share	of	contributions,	compared	to	the	
principal	UN	organs	that	see	the	Global	South	clearly	outnumber	the	Global	North.	74	states	
parties	 have	 contributed	 formally
vi
	to	 the	 seven	 meetings	 on	 LAWS	 from	 2014-2019.	 Of	











The	 data	 summarised	 in	 figure	 1	 demonstrates	 three	 interesting	 observations.	 First,	 the	
number	of	formal	contributions	made	by	states	parties	has	increased	over	time	and	across	
both	 North	 and	 South	 until	 2018.	 A	 particular	 jump	 can	 be	 seen	 after	 2016,	 indicating	 a	
growing	 interest	 in	 the	 then	 newly	 created	 UN-GGE.	 2019	 numbers	 of	 participation	 are	
currently	 below	 2018	 numbers.	 This	 could	 either	 indicate	 that	 the	 peak	 of	 interest	 was	
reached	in	2018	or	could	simply	be	due	to	the	fact	that	there	is	a	second	UN-GGE	meeting	
scheduled	 for	August	 2019.	 Second,	 the	number	of	 contributions	by	 the	Global	 South	has	
doubled	when	comparing	2014	and	2018.	Third,	data	also	clearly	indicates	the	growing	voice	
of	 ban	 supporters	 at	 the	 UN-CCW:	 while	 only	 five	 supporters	 of	 the	 ban	 on	 LAWS	
contributed	 to	 debate	 in	 2014,	 this	 number	 has	 grown	 to	 18	 in	 2018.	 As	 noted	 in	 the	




illustrate	 this	 further	 through	 providing	 a	 cursory	 trajectory	 of	 some	 Global	 South	
statements.	When	the	discussions	started,	Global	South	countries	typically	perceived	LAWS	
as	 a	 ‘science	 fiction	 issue	 that	 does	 not	 affect	 them	 directly’	 (interview	 1,	 25.04.2017).	 A	
notable	exception	was	Pakistan	who	was	quick	to	latch	on	to	the	topic	and	became	the	first	
Global	South	state	to	deliver	statements,	not	least	due	to	the	history	of	targeted	killing	via	
drone	 strikes	 on	 Pakistani	 territory.	 Early	 notable	 contributions	 by	Global	 South	 countries	
therefore	 turned	 around	 core	 NAM	 issues:	 political	 independence	 and	 the	 protection	 of	
territorial	integrity	and	sovereignty	(e.g.	India,	Mission	of	2014).	Initially,	likewise,	there	was	
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about	 whether	 debates	 on	 LAWS	 could	 be	 helpful	 at	 all	 as	 powerful	 countries	 are	 still	
perceived	to	do	whatever	they	want	in	terms	of	weapons	systems	(interview	2,	26.04.2017).	
	 But	Global	South	representatives	quickly	began	to	raise	a	distinct	normative	agenda,	
highlighting	 the	 ‘negative	 consequences’	 of	 LAWS	 (Mexico,	 Mission	 of	 2014)	 and	 voicing	
questions	 as	 to	 whether	 machines	 will	 ever	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 between	 civilian	 and	
combatants	and	therefore	be	able	to	adhere	to	key	principles	of	international	humanitarian	
law	 (Brazil,	 Mission	 of	 2014).	 More	 fundamentally,	 countries	 such	 as	 Ecuador	 have	
consistently	 condemned	 the	 delegation	 of	 kill	 decisions	 to	machines	 as	 ‘inacceptable	 and	
inadmissible’	 (Ecuador,	Mission	of	2014,	 2015,	2016).	As	 the	debate	on	 LAWS	progressed,	
Global	South	statements	have	become	more	 forceful	and	coordinated:	 in	November	2017,	
the	 NAM	 delivered	 a	 first	 joint	 statement	 urging	 states	 parties	 to	 move	 towards	 a	
negotiation	mandate	and	a	preventive	ban	on	LAWS	on	the	basis	of	‘mounting	expressions	
of	concerns	about	how	these	weapons	change	warfare’	(Non-Aligned	Movement	2017	p.2),	
including	 their	 destabilising	 potential	 in	 terms	 of	 lowering	 use-of-force	 thresholds.	 NAM	
delivered	further	joint	statements	of	a	similar	character	in	April	and	August	2018.	Similarly,	
in	April	 2018,	 the	African	Group	delivered	a	 strongly-worded	 joint	 statement	 supporting	a	
ban	 on	 LAWS:	 ‘The	 African	 Group	 finds	 it	 inhumane,	 abhorrent,	 repugnant,	 and	 against	
public	conscience	for	humans	to	give	up	control	 to	machines,	allowing	machines	to	decide	
who	 lives	or	dies,	how	many	 lives	and	whose	 life	 is	acceptable	as	collateral	damage	when	
force	is	used’	(2018	pp.1–2).	Over	the	duration	of	debates,	many	statements	and	comments	
by	 individual	 Global	 South	 states	 parties	 increasingly	 speak	 of	 a	 concerted	 effort	 towards	
defining	 and	understanding	meaningful	 human	 control,	 a	 concept	 originally	 introduced	by	
the	NGO	Article	36	(Roff	&	Moyes	2016),	according	to	clear	legal	principles	and	making	this	
the	 foundation	 of	 novel	 international	 legislation	 (e.g.	 Brazil,	 Mission	 of	 2019;	 Costa	 Rica,	
Mission	of	2018).		
	 We	can	therefore	identify	two	norm-making	strategies	pursued	by	the	Global	South	
in	making	 these	 increasingly	 forceful	 statements.	First,	Global	South	states	parties	use	 the	
institutional	 platform	 provided	 by	 the	 UN-CCW	 to	 position	 their	 calls	 towards	 new	
normative	guidance	on	LAWS	at	the	international	level.	Second,	Global	South	states	parties	
have	worked	closely	with	civil	 society	 representatives,	 such	as	 the	Campaign	 to	Stop	Killer	
Robots,	whose	contributions	they	also	mention	favourable	in	numerous	statements.	In	doing	
this,	 they	 use	 institutional	 platforms	 and	 build	 coalitions	 between	 states	 and	 civil	 society	




	 At	 present,	 we	 do	 not	 know	 whether	 these	 norm-making	 attempts	 will	 be	
successful.	 Norm-making	 success	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 states	
expressing	 their	 support	 for	 the	 concept	 of	meaningful	 human	 control	 at	 the	UN-CCW	or	
other	international	institutional	platforms,	its	integration	into	national	weapons	technology	
practices	and	security	doctrines,	as	well	as	 its	 legal	 institutionalisation	 in	the	context	of	an	
international	 legislative	ban	or	other	 regulation	on	LAWS.	However,	we	 should	not	expect	
overnight	 results:	 although	 recent	 humanitarian	 disarmament	 efforts,	 such	 as	 the	 NWPT,	




While	 norm-making	 in	 international	 relations	 has	 often	 been	 associated	 with	 Western	
states,	 this	 article	 joins	 a	 growing	 critical	 chorus	 indicating	 that	 this	 casting	 of	 the	 Global	
South	as	 recipients	of	norms	 is	 inaccurate	both	 in	historical	 and	current	perspectives.	 The	
ongoing	debate	about	LAWS	at	the	UN-CCW	in	Geneva	demonstrates	this	point	nicely	as	 it	
has	 become	 an	 increasingly	 important	 institutional	 platform	 of	 norm-making	 attempts	 by	
the	Global	 South	over	 the	 last	 four	 years.	 This	 speaks	 towards	 casting	a	 close	and	 serious	
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Stop	 Killer	 Robots	 has	 encouraged	 ill-informed	 countries	 subscribe	 to	 a	 ban	 on	 lethal	 autonomous	
weapon	system”	(2018	emphasis	added).		
iv
	The	 five	 protocols	 are:	 Protocol	 I	 on	weapons	with	 non-detectable	 fragments	 (entered	 into	 force	
1983),	Protocol	II	on	landmines	(entered	into	force	1983),	Protocol	III	on	incendiary	weapons	(entered	






	I	 understand	 formal	 contributions	 to	 consist	 of	 either	 delivering	 statements	 to	 the	 debate	 or	
contributing	working	papers	ahead	of	 the	meetings.	Many	meetings	provide	states	parties	with	 the	
opportunity	to	contribute	formally	multiple	times	–	especially	the	meetings	in	2015,	2018,	and	2019.	
All	 data	 is	 based	 on	 lists	 of	 statements	 as	 delivered	 at	 the	 UN-CCW	 collected	 by	 the	 civil	 society	
organisation	Reaching	Critical	Will	(Reaching	Critical	Will	2019).		
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Panama,	24.	Peru,	25.	State	of	Palestine,	26.	Uganda,	27.	Venezuela,	28.	Zimbabwe	(Campaign	to	stop	
killer	robots	2018).	
	
